We examine trends in the redistributive impact of the tax-transfer system in Australia between 1994 and 2009 using a framework that allows us to separate the contributions of taxes and benefits to overall income redistribution. Furthermore, we identify the effect of taxtransfer policy reforms on changes in income redistribution over the period by controlling for changes in the distribution of market incomes. We find that after reaching a peak value in the late 1990s, the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers steadily declined. Although reforms to the tax-transfer system contributed to the decline in redistribution, their contribution was limited.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, Australia has witnessed important economic changes. In particular, this was a period of sustained and strong economic growth that led to a substantial increase in real incomes. As recent empirical evidence shows, however, the rise in average living standards was accompanied by an increase in net income inequality and in the concentration of incomes at the top of the distribution (Wilkins 2013, Greenville et al. Atkinson and Leigh 2007) . Importantly, these changes in the mean and dispersion of incomes occurred in a period of signi…cant policy changes, especially with respect to the tax and transfer system. In fact, the last two decades saw the implementation of important …scal reforms, which included, among other things, several cuts in the two top marginal tax rates and signi…cant increases in the top income tax thresholds, as well as, the tightening of the access to welfare payments and reductions in withdrawal rates of means-tested bene…ts (Australian Senate 2012, Goodger and Larose 1999) . Interestingly, despite the potential distributional implications of these initiatives, the recent trends in redistribution and the contribution of the …scal reforms to the worsening of the income distribution remains an unexplored issue. It is the main aim of the present paper to …ll this gap in two steps.
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First, we study the trends in the redistributive impact of the income tax and transfer system in Australia between 1994 and 2009. We follow the measurement framework and methods outlined in Urban and Lambert (2008) and Kim and Lambert (2009) changes to the income support system. As shown in Section 5, these reforms altered the functional relationship between pre-…scal and post-…scal incomes by modifying the budget constraints and the e¤ective tax rates faced by di¤erent households along the income distribution. Evidence on the trends in redistribution and the e¤ect of these policy reforms over the recent decades is limited. Whiteford (2013, p. 39 ) computes the redistributive e¤ect of income taxes and transfers between 1981 and 1996 and …nds little change over that period. Using data from the SIHC and the HILDA survey, Wilkins (2013, p. 38-41) shows that the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers somewhat decreased between 1994 and 2009. These works, however, are completely uninformative about the distributive consequences of policy reforms as they examine the trends in income redistribution without controlling for the important transformations in the distribution of market income that occurred over the period. Here the main contribution of this paper is to provide a clear assessment of the impact of these policy reforms on income redistribution. Using the …xed-income approach proposed by Kasten et al. (1994) , we derive time-trends in the redistributive e¤ects and in the progressivity of taxes and transfers in the absence of changes in the distribution of market incomes. This is done by applying the tax and transfer schemes of di¤erent periods to a common distribution of income which allows intertemporal comparisons of tax-transfer policies while controlling for concomitant changes in market incomes. We …nd that although their impact was limited, the reforms to the tax-transfer system contributed to the decline in the redistributive impact in the 2000s.
Moreover, this result holds regardless of the distribution of incomes taken as reference.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the measurement framework used to derive trends in income redistribution and its vertical, horizontal and reranking components. In Section 3, we present the data and the features of interest of the tax-bene…t calculator. In Section 4, we discuss the changes in the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-transfer system between 1994 and 2009. Section 5 focuses on the role of policy reforms.
First, we discuss the main policy reforms implemented during this period and their e¤ects on the relationship between pre and post-…scal incomes. Second, we present the results from the …xed-income approach to evaluate the e¤ects of policy reforms. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
Measurement Framework
We anaylse the changes in the redistributive impact of the Australian tax-transfer system using decomposition techniques that permit to quantify the separate contributions of taxes and transfers to overall redistribution. As it is common in the literature on income redistribution, we focus our analysis on Gini-based measures. 1 For the present analysis, we adopt the notation used by Kim and Lambert (2009) and express the redistributive e¤ect of taxes, bene…ts, or net taxes (taxes minus bene…ts) as:
where G X and G N are, respectively, the Gini indices of pre-…scal income and post-…scal income after tax, bene…t, or net tax. Kakwani (1984) proposed the following decomposition of the redistributive e¤ect:
where V K is the vertical e¤ect of redistribution net of reranking and R is the overall level of reranking introduced by taxes, bene…ts, or net taxes. Reranking occurs when there are changes in the ranking of tax units by incomes in the transition from pre-to post-…scal incomes. The Kakwani's measure V K is interpreted as the inequality reducing e¤ect that one would be observed if there was no reranking in the transition from pre-to post-…scal incomes. As shown by Kakwani (1977) , in the absence of reranking the vertical component of taxes or transfers, when these are considered separately, is given by:
where C N is the concentration index of net income, g is the average tax or bene…t rate, and P K is Kawani's measure of progressivity. 2 In the case of the net tax, Lambert (1985) shows that the net vertical e¤ect depends exclusively on the average levels and progressivity of taxes and transfers and it can be expressed as: 1 For a review of the decompositions methods that have been proposed to evaluate the redistributive e¤ect of …scal systems see Urban (2009) . 2 This measure is de…ned as the di¤erence between the concentration index of taxes or bene…ts and the Gini coe¢ cient for pre-…scal income, G X :When taxes are progressive, the concentration curve of taxes lies below the Lorenz curve of income which implies a positive value of P K . In the case of transfers, a negative value of the index indicates progressivity. This is because progressive transfers are more concentrated at the bottom so that its concentration curve is above that of income.
where S T and S B denote, respectively, the contribution of taxes and bene…ts to the net vertical e¤ect, t and b are the average tax and bene…t rates as measured by the proportion of income accounted by taxes and bene…ts, P K T is the progressivity of taxes, and jP K B j is the absolute value of the progressivity index for bene…ts. 3 Further, we follow the methods outlined in Urban and Lambert (2008) to separate out the contribution of horizontal inequity from the vertical component, where horizontal inequity is the unequal treatment of tax units with the same pre-…scal income (i.e., the unequal treatment of equals). In particular, they propose to break down V K into:
Here, V is the vertical e¤ect that would remain once the horizontal inequity induced by the unequal treatment of equals, H, is eliminated. Thus, the term V is the potential redistributive e¤ect that would be observed if the reranking and the horizontal inequities in the system were eliminated. The estimation of the horizontal contribution requires the de…nition of close equal groups (CEGs) in terms of equivalised pre-…scal income for which a bandwidth is needed. Following van den Ven, Creedy, and Lambert (2001, 381), we use an optimal bandwidth that maximizes the vertical component V .
Given a set of CEGs, the horizontal component can be derived as:
where CÑ is the concentration index of a counterfactual post-…scal income distribution derived assuming that all units in a CEG face common tax and transfer rates equal to the ratio of taxes and transfers to total pre-…scal income for that particular CEG. 4 Thus, by measuring the departure of actual post-…scal incomes from those generated by a …scal system that is horizontal inequity-free within CEGs, the measure H is consistent with the notion of horizontal inequity followed by King (1983) and Jenkins (1994) . The combination of equations (2), (5) , and (6) leads to the following decomposition of the redistributive e¤ect:
proposed in Urban and Lambert (2008) . These authors recommend the use of this decomposition because, as they show, this is the only decomposition of RE into vertical, horizontal, and reranking components that takes into account all forms of reranking that have been identi…ed in the literature. The reranking term in (7) , R, is equal to the contribution of reranking in Kakwani's decomposition (2) and it captures the reordering of income units within CEGs, the reranking of entire CEGs, and also the shu-e of units across CEGs in the transition from pre to post-…scal income. 5 In practice, the reranking term is computed as a residual after the computation of the horizontal and vertical components.
Data Sources and Methods
To study the trends in the redistributive impact of the income tax 
where n a and n c are respectively the number of adults and children in the unit, is the weight attached to children and measures the extent of economies of scale. The weight attached to children, , was set at 0.6 and the economies of scale parameter was set at =0. 8 . These values produce scales that are similar to the OECD scales.
Following Kim and Lambert's (2009) analysis of the U.S. tax-transfer system, we consider market income as our pre-…scal income variable for the computation of the redistributive e¤ect of the net tax and bene…ts, whereas for income taxes the pre-…scal variable is gross income de…ned as the sum of market income plus bene…ts. Table 1 shows the correspondence between pre and post-…scal variables and the di¤erent income variables for taxes, bene…ts and net taxes. Market income includes the value of wages and salaries from all jobs, own unincorporated business income, investment income including interests, rents, and dividend income, private pensions, and other types of private income. Gross income and net income (after tax and transfers) values are derived using the tax amounts and transfer payments calculated by MITTS. Lastly, all the results are aggregated to the population level using the weights provided with the SIHCs. Between 1994 and 2009 Australia witnessed a period of strong economic growth that led to a signi…cant rise in the average real incomes. As Figure 1 shows, there was an important increase in both real market and net incomes. By 2009 mean market income was $39,377, more than $13,000 larger than the mean value in 1994 indicate that the e¤ect of reranking was fairly constant in the period under analysis and that removing the reranking induced by the …scal system would increase the redistributive impact of the net tax by less than 3 per cent.
Estimates of the separate contributions of taxes and transfers (S T and S B ) to the vertical redistribution of the net tax suggest that transfers account for most of the redistribution achieved by the …scal system. This is in spite of the fact that the magnitude of taxes, as a proportion of income, is substantially larger than that of bene…ts. In this regard, Australia is similar to most advanced economies, with the notable exception of the US where the tax system plays a large role in income redistribution (Bastagli et al. 6 For the maximization, a grid of bandwidth values given by the sequence f5; 10; :::; 1000g was considered. 7 To check the robustness of the results we also estimated the redistributive e¤ects for the 2001-10 period using data from the HILDA survey. Results from this analysis available upon request yields very similar time-trends in income redistribution. See also Wilkins (2013) for a comparison of the time-trends in income redistribution using SIHC and HILDA data. The changes in the redistributive e¤ect of the income tax system were of smaller magnitudes. However, by 2009 its redistributive e¤ect was below the peak level observed in the late 1990s. This decline was mostly driven by the fall in the vertical equity of the income tax observed since 1999, whereas the average tax rate remained fairly stable. Hence, in contrast to the evolution of the bene…t system, it is the reduction in tax progressivity rather than changes in the size of the tax system that explains the decline in its redistributive e¤ect. Indeed, tax progressivity as measured by Kawani's disproportionality index P K declined from 0.27 in 1997 to 0.23 in 2005 and, despite increases in the following years, by 2009 tax progressivity was still below its level at the start of the decade. Notes: RE is the redistributive e¤ect; t and b are the average tax and transfer rates; P K and V Australia has been traditionally described as a liberal welfare regime where strong emphasis is placed on the provision of welfare through market mechanisms. However, unlike other liberal systems where the transfer system is …nanced by contributions from employers, welfare payments in Australia are only funded from general taxation revenue as there are no social security contributions. Underpinned by the principle of self-reliance by which every citizen with capacity to work should do so, the Australian welfare system is aimed to help only those who are most in need while limiting the tax burden and the overall spending in order to minimize work disincentives. Thus, Australia is one of the OECD countries with the lowest levels of tax and social expenditures, as well as the country with the most targeted system (Whiteford, 2013) . Over the last two decades, similarly to other developed countries, Australia's social security system has seen major reforms clearly aimed at reducing welfare dependency and promoting self-reliance through paid work (Goodger and Larose 2005, Costello 2006 ). Australian …scal policy has been subject to a continuous process of reforms, which can be traced back to the signi…cant reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that led to the broadening of the tax base. These reforms have been mostly driven by the principle of e¢ ciency more than those of equity and simplicity (Tran-Nam et al. 2006). Between 1994 and 2009 the tax rate structure underwent multiple changes aimed at mitigating the negative impact of income taxes and bene…ts on labour supply. The top marginal rate was unchanged from 1994 to 2005, when it was reduced from 47 to 45 per cent, the level at which it has remained since then. But the range of incomes over which the top marginal tax rate applies was altered due to the large increase in the top tax threshold. In constant 1994 dollars, the latter went from $50,000 in 1994 to $71,128 in 2005 and to $119,759 in 2009. Changes were also signi…cant in the second top rate as it was cut multiple times, falling from 43 per cent in 1994 to 38 per cent by 2009. In contrast, the real value of the taxfree threshold fell in the 1994-2009 period which means that low-income tax payers were a¤ected by bracket-creeping. To mitigate this e¤ect, the coverage of certain tax o¤sets, in particular the Low Income Tax O¤set, were extended.
The period between 1994 and 2009 also saw important reforms to the income support system. The Working Nation package in 1994, the Australians Working Together package of 2003, the 2006 Welfare to Work reform, and even the more recent Building Australia's Future Workforce reform in 2011 all introduced policy initiatives to strengthen the incentives to work. This was in part done by reducing the withdrawal rates of most income-tested government bene…ts. The 100 per cent withdrawal rate applicable to most allowance payments prior to 1994 was …rst reduced to 70 per cent in 1995 and then to 60 per cent in 2006. As regards family payments, the 1994-2009 period saw a signi…cant increase in the real value of the withdrawal-free threshold that determines the eligibility for the maximum rate of family payments. This increase was accompanied by a reduction in the withdrawal rate that applies for incomes in excess of the withdrawal-free threshold: in 2000 this rate was cut from 50 to 30 cents in the dollar, and from 2004 this rate was further reduced to 20 per cent. Interestingly, recent research shows that despite the emphasis on reducing the disincentives to work, the reforms to the tax-transfer system did not lead to a reduction in the marginal e¤ective tax rates (METRs) faced by families, perhaps because of the large income growth over the period. Policy reforms during the 2000s increased the conditionality of the system by tightening the access to welfare payments. In the case of unemployment, this was implemented through tougher activity tests and higher penalties for non-compliance, by extending the waiting periods for those who have accumulated some savings, and by imposing a two-year waiting period for new immigrants. Further, the eligibility criterion for the Disability and Parenting pensions was tightened so that only individuals unable to work more than 15 hours per week and sole-parents whose youngest kid is under six were eligible, respectively. As a consequence, some sole-parents and people with disabilities have been shifted from pension to allowance payments, which may have a¤ected the redistributive e¤ect of the welfare system given the growing gap between pensions and allowances caused by di¤erent rules of indexation. 8 Figure 2 summarizes the e¤ect of these policy reforms on the relationship between market and net incomes for some key demographic groups. The …gures plot the budget constraints for couples with and without children, lone parents and singles for the …nancial years 1999/00 and 2007/08, a period which covers major reform packages and corresponds to the period in which most of the decline in income redistribution occurred (see previous section).
Before discussing the results, however, an explanation of how the budget constraints were constructed is in order. First, for each individual of working age in the household survey, market and net incomes are computed using the tax-bene…t calculator from MITTS assuming di¤erent labour supply points ranging from 0 to 50 hours of work and using observed hourly wage rates. 9 Speci…cally, 11 labour supply points were considered for all individuals except for men in couple for whom only 6 alternatives were used. Hence, we derive between 6 and 11 points of each individual's budget constraint, which are then linked by linear extrapolation. This budget constraint, therefore, re ‡ects the transformation of market income, including labour and capital income, into net incomes for di¤erent labour supply points ranging between 0 and 50 hours. 10 The budget constraints shown in Figure 2 were derived by applying this method on data from the 2007/08 SIHC and by averaging over working-age individuals using sample weights. Two sets of budget constraints are presented, corresponding to those obtained using the tax and transfer systems of 2007/08 and 1999/2000, respectively. 11 Figure 2 reveals that the various policy reforms implemented between 1999/00 and 2007/08 contributed to increase the slopes of the ‡attest parts of the budget constraints under the 1999/00 system. In other words, the successive reductions in taper rates and income tax rates ensured that the highest METRs were reduced, in a systematic e¤ort to increase incentives to work. However, these e¤orts led to asymmetric e¤ects over the income range. As the …gures for the di¤erent groups clearly show, policy reforms acted to reduce the average e¤ective tax rate of high-income earners whereas they either did not a¤ect it at low-income levels, or even reduced it in the case of singles. This came along with a general reduction in the highest METRs, a feature which is particularly apparent for couples with children. Within this group, individuals on annual private incomes between $30,000 to $50,000, who were facing particularly high METRs under the 1999/00 system, saw large reductions in their METRs as evidenced by the increased slope of their budget constraints.
Overall, policy reforms between 1999 and 2007 acted to reduce the average e¤ective tax rate of middle and high-income households in all demographic groups. The reduction in top marginal income tax rates, the reductions in taper rates, and the increase in family tax bene…t payments are all important factors that contributed to this trend. This suggests that these reforms contributed to an increase in disposable income inequality. Source: Authors'calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data
Policy Evaluations: The Fixed-Income Approach
The study of …scal reforms and their e¤ects on redistribution is important because it is informative about the government's actions to redistribute income and it provides valuable information for the design of future reforms. However, policy reforms are generally implemented as packages combining multiple changes, which means that their distributional consequences are far from obvious. Moreover, observed changes in income redistribution over time are the compound result of (i) trends in the distribution of market incomes and (ii) policy changes that alter the capacity of taxes and transfers to redistribute income. Therefore, assessing the redistributive implications of policy reforms is not a trivial task as one must be able to isolate the policy e¤ect from the e¤ect of other changes in the distribution of market income. The …xed-income approach proposed by Kasten et al.(1994) provides a straightforward framework to isolate these e¤ects. Widely used in the literature on income redistribution and tax policy (for example, see Thorensen 2004 , Lambert and Thorensen 2009 , Thorensen et al. 2012 , this method provides a baseline for the identi…cation of policy e¤ects by keeping the distribution of market incomes …xed and by applying the tax and transfer schemes of di¤erent periods to this distribution of reference. 12 It is important to recognise, however, that this approach only isolates what we could call the immediate policy e¤ects as it does not account in any way for behavioural responses to these policy reforms, a point to which we come back below. Another important issue in this type of analysis is the sensitivity of the conclusions to the choice of the base distribution. To assess the robustness of our …ndings, we identify the policy e¤ect using three di¤erent pre-…scal income distributions as reference, those of 1999, 2000 and 2007. We …nd that our results do not depend on the choice of the reference distribution.
Let F denote the distribution of market income and let N F ( ) represent the distribution of net income that would result from exposing the distribution F to the …scal policy . All the information required to evaluate the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-transfer system is then summarized in the pair (F; N F ( )). The identi…cation of the policy e¤ect using the …xed-income method requires the application of the …scal policy t from the di¤erent periods t = 1; ::; T to a base distribution F B . This allows the construction of the sequence of pairs f(F B ; N F B ( t ))g T t=1 that can be used to quantify the changes in the redistributive impact that would have been observed in the absence of changes in the distribution of market incomes. To derive the distribution of post-…scal variables that results from applying the tax and transfer system from di¤erent years to the common distribution we make use of the tax-bene…t calculator component of MITTS. For these simulations pre-…scal incomes are in ‡ated (or de ‡ated) to the year of the tax and transfer system being considered by using the wage index base on average earnings for full-time workers provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 13 Where income tax parameters are varied independently of the bene…t parameters, the former are also in ‡ated (or de ‡ated) to the year of the bene…t parameters by using the same wage index. Figure 3 .a shows that net income inequality would have increased between 1994 and 2009 even in the absence of any change in the distribution of market incomes. This is indicated by the upward trend in the Gini index of net income regardless of the base year used for the evaluation. This means that policy reforms implemented over the period contributed to the decline in the redistributive capacity of the tax-transfer system by increasing net income inequality. Figure 3 .b suggests that in a scenario with no changes in the distribution of market income, changes in policies would have led to a decline in the redistributive e¤ect of taxes and transfers of about 5 per cent between 1994 and 2007. This means, however, that policy reforms can account only for a small part of the overall decline in redistributive e¤ect over the period, most of which is therefore due to changes in market income distribution.
The results for bene…ts presented in Figure 4 indicate that reforms to the transfer system cannot account for the large decline in the redistributive e¤ect of bene…ts over the period. In fact, the simulated series plotted in Figures 4.a and 4 .b. show that most of the variation in the redistributive impact and in the average bene…t rate observed since 1994 disappear once changes in market incomes are controlled for. In the absence of changes in market incomes, the redistributive impact of transfers would have been reduced by about 5 per cent between 1994 and 2007, well below the 35 per cent fall actually observed in the data. As regards the size of bene…ts, the simulated trends indicate that policy changes alone had a limited impact on the average transfer rate with the level of 2009 being very similar to that in 1994 once changes in market income are accounted for. Again, this implies that the fall in the redistributive impact of bene…ts was largely driven by changes in market income distribution. This is not particularly surprising as the 1994-2009 period was a period of strong economic growth and increased employment rates, which translated into much less reliance on the income support system. In this context, average bene…t rates and their redistributive e¤ect are expected to decrease.
In contrast, the results for taxes shown in Figure 5 indicate that changes to the tax system explain to a large extent the decline in the redistributive impact of taxes over the 1994-2009 period. They show that in the absence of any other changes in the distribution of gross incomes, 14 the redistributive impact of taxes and the average tax rate would have been about 10 to 15 per cent lower by 2009 than in 1994. Reforms to the tax schedule explain this decline. Concretely, the various cuts in marginal tax rates and the increase in the top income thresholds, as well as, the extension of di¤erent tax o¤sets over the period help to explain the reduction in the share of income paid in taxes, despite rapid income growth. Interestingly, however, these policy initiatives cannot explain the decline in tax progressivity observed between 1997 and 2005, although they do explain much of the upward trend in progressivity between 2005 and 2009. In other words, tax reforms, and in particular those introduced between 2005 and 2009, led to a more progressive tax system. Thus, when gross incomes are held …xed, the progressivity of the income tax by 2009 is around 5 to 10 per cent higher that in 1994. 
Source: Authors'calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data

Conclusions
Over the last two decades there has been signi…cant changes in the distribution of income in Australia. The rise in average income due to rapid economic growth came along with an increase in net income inequality. This occurred despite the improvement in the distribution of market income, which poses an interesting question about the redistributive capacity of the tax-transfer system and how this has been a¤ected by the policy reforms implemented over the last twenty years. Despite its relevance, however, research on the trends in the redistributive impact of taxes and bene…ts in Australia is very limited. In fact, the recent works by Whiteford (2010 Whiteford ( , 2013 and Wilkins (2013) are the only studies that have investigated this issue to date. Besides complementing these studies by presenting the evolution of a broader range of redistributive and progressivity measures between 1994 and 2009, this paper constitutes the …rst attempt to identify the speci…c contributions of tax-transfer policy reforms to recent trends in income redistribution.
Consistent with the results from previous studies, we …nd that the redistributive impact of the tax-transfer system declined in the period between 1994 and 2007. After reaching a peak value in the late 1990s, the net redistributive e¤ect of the system started a steady decline in the 2000s so that the redistributive impact by 2009 was about 20 per cent lower than in 1994. The decomposition of the redistribute e¤ects shows that this decline was largely driven by the vertical and horizontal components of income redistribution with the contribution of reranking remaining small and fairly constant over the whole period. Transfers account for most of the income redistribution in Australia: they contributed more than 80 per cent to vertical redistribution until 2005. However, this contribution started to decline in the early 2000s. This decline was caused by the fall in the size of the transfer system and not by changes in its progressivity. The decline in the demand for welfare payments in a period of employment growth, as well as, the inability of welfare payments to keep up with income growth are likely to explain this drop in average transfer rates. Although it is of smaller magnitude, the 1994-2009 period also saw a decline in the redistributive impact of the income tax. In contrast with transfers, this decline was caused by a reduction in tax progressivity rather than by changes in the average tax rate.
We investigate the contribution of the tax-transfer policy reforms since the mid-1990s to the observed decline in income redistribution. Previous studies by Whiteford (2010 Whiteford ( , 2013 and Wilkins (2013) provide no insight on the role of policy changes as they are based on summary measures of redistribution that confound changes in the distribution of pre-…scal income with the impact of policy reforms. We isolate the e¤ect of tax-transfer policies using the …xed-income approach that allows intertemporal comparisons of policies by applying the tax and transfer schemes of di¤erent periods to a common distribution of market incomes. Our results indicate that net income inequality would have increased even in the absence of changes in the distribution of market incomes. This implies that policy reforms contributed to the decline in the redistributive capacity of the …scal system. However, policy reforms only account for a small part of the decline in income redistribution, most of which was explained by changes in the distribution of market incomes.
Although useful to isolate the immediate impact of policy reforms, the …xed-income analysis provides no insight on the other factors underlying the changes in income redistribution. In particular, it remains silent about the factors behind the changes in market incomes and the extent to which these are induced by behavioral responses to policy reforms. Shedding light on these issues calls for the development of new and more complex analytical approaches. This is the subject of much-needed ongoing research (see Bargain 2012, Creedy and Herault 2011 and Herault and Azpitarte 2013).
